by
Hatem Al-Shamea
Introduction
Yemen’s ongoing civil war is an exceptionally complex and multifaceted conflict involving a multiplicity of internal and external actors [[1]]. Despite numerous attempts by the international community to broker peace, the situation has become deadlocked [[2]]. Any cogent analysis of the conflict requires examining the motivations and actions of the various belligerents involved [[3]]. Chief among them are the Houthis, a movement deeply entrenched in Yemen’s history yet often mischaracterized [[4]]. While frequently framed as a proxy battle between regional powers like Iran and the Saudi/UAE coalition, the war cannot be reduced to neat categorizations or simplistic narratives [[5]]. It stems from both genuine local grievances and ideological struggles as well as opportunistic foreign interventions [[6]]. Understanding the layering of sectarian, separatist, and geopolitical dimensions is crucial to unpacking Yemen’s “model transitional process” gone awry [[7]].
The Seeds of Conflict – Local Grievances and Foreign Interference
The Houthis originated as a Zaidi Shiite revivalist group in the 1990s seeking to counter their marginalization by the Yemeni government [[8]]. Their demands reflected genuine frustration over underdevelopment in northern tribal areas. However, they also received backing from Iran and later from former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to battle his successor’s regime [[9]].
The 2011 Arab Spring protests led to Saleh’s engineered ouster, dismantling the Yemeni army to curb opposition to Gulf agendas [[10]]. The resulting turmoil enabled the Houthis and Southern secessionists to seize territory [[11]]. In 2014, the Houthis took Sanaa with help from Saleh forces. Despite local support against corruption, their regional backing and forced ideological indoctrination alienated many Yemenis [[12]].
When the Houthis expanded southwards in 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition including the UAE to launch a military intervention [[13]]. While Saleh later realigned with Saudi Arabia, his assassination in 2017 helped the Houthis consolidate control in the north [[14]]. The UAE backed Southern separatists against Saudi-supported President Hadi, seeking to divide the nation for its own geopolitical gain [[15]].
Internal and External Dimensions of a Schism
The war thus cannot be simply categorized as a Sunni-Shia sectarian rift or proxy conflict between Saudi and Iran [[16]]. The Houthis fused ideological fervor with pragmatic shifting alliances, not always aligning with Iran’s regional agenda [[17]]. Meanwhile, the Saudi-UAE coalition exploited sectarian narratives to legitimize intervention while masking divergent goals in a fragmented Yemen [[18]].
According to scholars, the multidimensional war mingles “regional ambitions with local grievances” [[19]]. The Houthis harbor long-held resentments alongside religious dogmatism, now exacerbated by external arming [[20]]. Meanwhile, opportunistic foreign powers fuel violence through selective alliances with “competing armed groups” divided by complex cleavages [[21]].
Paradoxically, Houthi pragmatism coexists with ideological zealotry [[22]]. They readily partner with Iran one moment and Saudi Arabia the next. The war reflects local struggles for access, identity and security amidst deep mistrust between communities and regions – fissures that foreign interests readily exploit [[23]]. Such focus often gets lost in broad-brush depictions of inexorable sectarian hatreds or inevitable proxy warfare [[24]].
Humanitarian Fallout – Yemen on the Brink
After seven years, the war has unleashed profound humanitarian suffering on the Yemeni populace [[25]]. Over 150,000 people have died from the violence with 3.3 million internally displaced [[26]]. The economy has collapsed, leaving two-thirds of the population food insecure and over 4 million children malnourished [[27]].
Health systems have been decimated, with only half of facilities fully functioning [[28]]. Outbreaks of cholera and other diseases are rampant, currently exacerbated by flooding [[29]]. The UN calls it the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world” as vital infrastructure remains in ruin [[30]].
This human toll shows the inadequacy of viewing Yemen solely through a geopolitical lens [[31]]. As civilians bear the brunt, scholars emphasize conflict analysis should spotlight “Yemeni agency and perspectives” over external generalizations [[32]]. For a nation fragmented across numerous divides, peace necessitates reconciliation that addresses multifaceted internal grievances [[33]].
Paths Forward – Seeking Elusive Compromise
After numerous failed ceasefires and diplomatic efforts, the path towards resolving the Yemen war remains unclear [[34]]. Houthi military gains have strengthened their bargaining position in potential future talks [[35]]. However, their maximalist demands could scuttle negotiations [[36]]. For lasting peace, a delicate balancing is required between Houthi interests, southern secessionist aims, Hadi government authority, and Saudi coalition goals [[37]].
Scholar Marie-Christine Heinze proposes a federal system granting some autonomy to the Houthis and southerners under an inclusive unity government [[38]]. However, bridging Yemen’s divides requires compromises that balance hardline ideologues with more flexible voices [[39]]. Otherwise, divisions may ossify with continued external meddling [[40]].
Ultimately, Yemenis themselves must guide the peace process for sustainable outcomes [[41]]. But the multiplicity of identities, ideologies and interests at play across the nation’s diverse landscape resist simple solutions [[42]]. Ending the war demands nuanced conflict analysis mindful of layered internal schisms and external opportunism [[43]]. Only by acknowledging multifaceted roots can the seeds of reconciliation take hold in Yemen’s battered soil [[44]]. With wisdom and will, unity and peace may yet emerge from the fragments of a fractured nation [[45]].
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[1] Al-Dawsari, 2018
[2] Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2021
[3] Philips, 2021
[4] Salmoni, Loidolt & Wells, 2010
[5] Baron, 2019
[6] Gaston & Al-Dawsari, 2019
[7] Nußberger, 2017
[8] Philips, 2021
[9] Medina Gutiérrez, 2019
[10] Al-Sakkaf, 2015
[11] Baron, 2019
[12] Manea, 2021
[13] Philips, 2021
[14] Barakat & Milton, 2019
[15] Hani & Al Hinai, 2020
[16] Philips, 2021
[17] Manea, 2021
[18] Mulqueen, 2021
[19] Gaston & Al-Dawsari, 2019
[20] Seyedi Asl, Leylanoğlu, Bahremani & Zabardastalamdari, 2021
[21] Perkins, 2017
[22] Manea, 2021
[23] Carapico, 2018
[24] Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2021
[25] Bengio & Ben-Dor, 2019
[26] UN OCHA, 2021
[27] UNICEF, 2021
[28] Bengio & Ben-Dor, 2019
[29] WHO, 2022
[30] Dunning, 2018
[31] Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2021
[32] Al-Dawsari, 2018
[33] Heinze, 2021
[34] Salisbury, 2021
[35] Knights, 2021
[36] Barakat & Milton, 2019
[37] Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2021
[38] Heinze, 2021
[39] Carapico, 2020
[40] Horton, 2020
[41] Al-Dawsari, 2018
[42] Carapico, 2018
[43] Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2021
[44] Philips, 2021
[45] Heinze, 2021
